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Recently, a new paradigm has emerged in mind and brain sciences. Radical embodied neuroscience
(REN) aims to respond to the problems of mapping particular cognitive functions to narrowly
defined brain regions. Accordingly, the proponents of this approach call for research to move
beyond heuristics of localization and decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). In this
commentary, we focus solely on the functional connectivist blend of REN. Supporters of this
position (see e.g., Kiverstein and Miller, 2015 for an interesting analysis of recent works on
emotions and cognition) build their argument on the supposed failure of the project to divide the
brain into functionally distinct areas responsible for particular cognitive processes. Drawing upon
the work on functional connectivism (Anderson, 2010, 2014), they suggest a paradigm shift in brain
research from neuroscience focusing on how the brain implements narrowly defined cognitive
functions, to one in which the locus of explanation is determined by the dynamic interactions
between the brain and the non-neural body embedded in the organism’s ecological niche.
We aim to point to two core challenges facing the line of argumentation adopted by
the functional connectivist supporters of REN. Firstly, the “how” challenge concerns the lack
of guidelines regarding how embodied cognitive neuroscience should proceed and build its
explanations without reference to localizable neural underpinnings. This challenge is obviously
directed at themore general proposal of a shift toward an embodied understanding of neuroscience.
Secondly, the “why” challenge is concerned with the motivation for abandoning (or considering
whether to abandon) localization and decomposition, given that current neuroscientific methods
of analysis (e.g., network analysis) havemeaningfully repurposed these heuristics by drawing on the
insights of functional connectivity (Klein, 2012). Finally, we propose that both of these challenges
are dissolved by the application of a mechanistic explanation of these phenomena, which not only
provides a naturalistically plausible framework (e.g., Miłkowski, 2013; Matyja, 2015) for embodied
cognitive neuroscience, but does justice to the work of Anderson (2014) and the opponents of the
strong modularity thesis (e.g., Mundale, 2002; Price and Friston, 2005).
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THE “HOW” CHALLENGE: ISN’T IT
BETTER JUST TO RECOMPOSE?
REN’s call (Kiverstein andMiller, 2015) for reconsideration of the
localization (of the neural underpinnings of assumed cognitive
function) and decomposition (of particular cognitive processes
into explanatorily “manageable” parts) is not without problems.
How should neuroscience proceed without these methodological
tools? Kiverstein and Miller’s positive proposal, which focuses on
interpreting contemporary findings on emotion and cognition,
does not answer this important question, but is instead based
on what we call “that” claims (e.g., “that” the localization and
decomposition practices should be abandoned in favor of the
novel research framework; “that” these two research heuristics
essentially fail, and “that” it impossible to localize given neural
underpinnings—see the discussion below).
Our positive proposal is to answer the “how” challenge
by adopting the methodology of the mechanistic explanation
framework—the idea that localization and decomposition
heuristics are useful to the extent to which they enable researchers
to later causally recompose a given cognitive function and
its neural correlates into the context of the workings of the
organism as a whole. Such recomposition should proceed with
the identification of cognitive mechanisms responsible for the
occurrence of a given cognitive phenomenon, as well as the
identification of the overall role that such mechanisms serve
within the context (Bechtel, 2009) of an entire organism and its
interactions with environment. These two essential steps seem to
be impossible if we abandon the localization and decomposition
heuristics altogether, since decomposing of amechanism requires
identifying what its parts are. Moreover, it remains unclear why
neuroscience should move beyond these tools, given that new
methods, such as network-based analysis, apply exactly those
heuristics in order to elucidate the relationship between the
neural and extra-neural contexts of the cognitive mechanism and
the organism.
THE “WHY” CHALLENGE: WHY SHOULD
WE GO RADICAL?
One of the main reasons proponents of REN question the
heuristics of localization and decomposition is the growing
evidence (Price and Friston, 2005) against the possibility
of mapping singular cognitive functions onto narrowly
circumscribed brain regions. The discovery of pluripotency
(i.e., the participation of a particular region in carrying out
more than one cognitive function, Anderson, 2010, 2014) and
degeneracy (i.e., different regions “taking over” the performance
of a particular function after a given brain area is damaged
or disabled, Friston and Price, 2003; Edelman and Gally,
2001; Figdor, 2010) has led to a debate about individuation of
psychological processes which ought to play an explanatory role
in neuroscientific research. Such debates about the cognitive
ontology of neuroscience have been used by REN supporters to
argue that the impossibility of “strict” localization, understood
as a one-one mapping of functions to regions, can only be
circumvented by using the extra-neural contexts of body and
environment to define and individuate psychological functions.
However, in doing this, the REN proponents seem to ignore
(with a notable exception of Silberstein and Chemero, 2013)
the more advanced method of network analysis. Unlike region-
based analysis, the network-based project does not rely on
the strict understanding of localization and is compatible with
the hypothesis of massive neural redeployment (or MRH)
(Anderson, 2007, 2010), according to which brain regions with
particular causal roles can be constitutive in different cognitive
processes. Network-based analysis respects this insight by
allowing for a particular brain region to realize different cognitive
functions in virtue of participating within different functional
networks. Crucially, such neural contexts can be individuated by
testing hypotheses regarding similar (or dissimilar) experimental
tasks. Although, individuating the causal role that a single
region plays in different functional networks on the basis
of task design may sometimes be problematic, task oriented
heuristics provide a fertile ground for hypothesis testing and
comparison (Klein, 2012), due to clearly defined and controllable
parameters. This poses particular problems for the REN
supporters. Firstly, it means that although cognitive neuroscience
is not committed to a strict notion of localization, it nevertheless
remains committed to some form of localization (e.g., non-
strict localization in the sense of Anderson’s works). Accordingly,
it remains unclear why the discipline should follow REN
proponents’ call to consider extra-neural contexts. Secondly,
given the aforementioned compatibility of the network project
not only with pluripotency/degeneracy and MRH, but also with
localization and recomposition, it is unclear why neuroscience
should move beyond examining the relation between neural
contexts and tasks. More importantly, why should a definition of
cognitive functions in terms of loosely defined ecological contexts
be preferred over an identification through clearly delineated and
comparable tasks?
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